Money Laundering, Global Financial Instability, and Tax Havens in the Pacific Islands by van Fossen, Anthony B.
Pacific Islands offshore financial centers (ofcs) are battling for their sur-
vival against the danger that international organizations will cut them off
from the global financial system.1 This threat is supported by accusations
that offshore centers in Oceania promote money laundering, harmful tax
practices, and instability in the world financial system.2 The multilateral
programs of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development on harmful
tax competition, and the Financial Stability Forum have been distinct but
related and coordinated attacks on centers in the Pacific Islands and else-
where. These assaults have gained momentum since the mid-1990s. The
image of tax havens in the region has been shaped most by the “horror
story” of Nauru—the mass media’s account of how Nauru was involved
in the Bank of New York scandal and other cases of facilitating tens of
billions of dollars of Russian money laundering, tax evasion, and illegal
capital flight.
The most powerful media critiques of Pacific Islands offshore financial
centers have asserted their complicity in “money laundering”—a new
term that emerged in the 1970s to define a social problem. It has been
associated in the popular consciousness with reports that tax havens
around the world help to hide the origins of and legitimate hundreds of
billions of dollars of illegal drug profits every year. Public hostility toward
offshore centers has been connected with media images of drug lords
acquiring tremendous wealth, laundered through secretive tax havens,
while narcotics ruin lives, addict babies, produce street crimes, and spread
hiv/aids. 
Many members of the public are only vaguely aware that since the
mid-1980s some countries have broadened the legal definition of money
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laundering to include illegal capital flight, tax evasion, insider trading,
bribery, fraud, corruption, misappropriation of public funds, racketeering,
arms trafficking, terrorism, prostitution, and a growing number of other
crimes as “predicate offenses” (ie, transgressions for which money can ille-
gally be laundered). The widening range of offenses covered by the term
has helped to produce constant reports that money laundering (particu-
larly for non-drug crimes) is growing very rapidly—helping the media to
create the impression of a “crime wave.” 
While many aspects of money laundering are real threats to human
welfare, these problems are subjected to collective definition. Many harm-
ful activities existed before they were considered to be problems or defined
in terms of money laundering. Countries differ in their exact definition of
money laundering because they cannot agree on what constitutes a pred-
icate crime. Capital flight or Internet gambling may be illegal in one coun-
try but perfectly lawful in another. Terrorism is defined differently in Israel
than in Arab countries. Furthermore, there is considerable debate within
countries (eg, the United States; see Adams 2000) about which of a widen-
ing range of predicate crimes should be prosecuted under existing money
laundering statutes. 
Some scholars, such as Robin Thomas Naylor (1999) and Petrus C van
Duyne (1998), have suggested that relatively little is actually known about
money laundering, and what is known is often ignored by law enforcers
and the media. The issue is highly emotional, and increasingly the phrase
“money laundering” is a stimulus eliciting unreflective conditioned
responses rather than thought or insight. Anti-laundering measures make
citizens feel better (with cleaner consciences) and it may not be in the
interests of well-funded law enforcement agencies and their allies in the
media to develop a more accurate and rational view of the issue. The
threat of money laundering is politically, economically, and socially con-
structed (see Best 1989). Those accused of money laundering may be not
the worst offenders but only the easiest targets.
Growing Tensions
The reality of money laundering is elusive, but perceptions of laundering
are concrete products of the way the media inform the world. In the late
1990s the anti-laundering campaign shifted from attempting to identify
suspicious transactions toward naming suspicious countries. Pacific
Islands offshore financial centers have increasingly been portrayed in the
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media as unrepentant “enemy deviants” (Gusfield 1967)—being socially
organized to operate in a deviant manner, challenging the campaign
against money laundering, and deserving stronger legal restriction, but
rarely being punished.
Pacific Islands offshore financial centers have been stigmatized episod-
ically for a number of years. The remoteness of havens in Oceania from
most people’s experience means that the audience is unlikely to be critical
of the media’s interpretations. In the early and mid-1980s the US Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (under William Roth) exposed
the criminal use of offshore banks in the Northern Marianas (US Senate
1983), but this did not generate much media or political interest at the
time. However, this work formed an early part of the subcommittee’s find-
ings, which eventually prompted passage of the Money Laundering Con-
trol Act of 1986.3 This legislation (the first in the world to criminalize
money laundering) became the model that the United States encouraged
or pressured all countries to replicate. Anti-laundering crusaders have
become convinced that criminals seek the laxest jurisdictions and that law
enforcement must be global and uniform. 
In 1988 the United Nations adopted the Convention Against Illicit Traf-
fic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (the Vienna Conven-
tion), which was the first international agreement to require the crimi-
nalization of narcotics-related laundering 4—although the term “money
laundering” was not used. Well over one hundred states have become par-
ties to the convention—including an increasing number that host offshore
centers. The Vienna Convention created a solid base in international law
for extending the fight against laundering to financial centers around the
world (Alexander 2001; Gilmore 1995). 
Bad publicity for Pacific Islands offshore financial centers became far
more common after the Financial Action Task Force on Money Launder-
ing (fatf) was created by a g-7 summit in 1989 and this new interna-
tional organization began its extraordinarily successful campaign to draw
attention to global money laundering. Nauru and Vanuatu had occasion-
ally been listed as suspected laundering locations in the Australian and
Pacific Islands media (eg, South Sea Digest, 19 April 1985; Sydney Morn-
ing Herald, 4 April 1985), but their reputations were damaged more exten-
sively as Time Magazine highlighted their alleged role as centers for laun-
dering in a feature article on the subject published around the world (18
Dec 1989). The same accusations were reiterated in another prominent
US periodical (US News and World Report, 19 Feb 1990). In 1991 New
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Zealand’s Serious Fraud Office aired its suspicions that offshore banks in
Nauru, Vanuatu, and Tonga were laundering drug money, although it
could find no evidence that this was the case in the Cook Islands (Pacific
Magazine, Sept 1993). In 1990 Nauru and Vanuatu were labeled as cen-
ters for narcotics money laundering, in the US Senate (1990a; 1990b, 1).
Senator John Kerry, a Democrat from Massachusetts, at that time the
principal anti-laundering crusader in the US Congress, strongly criticized
Nauru, Vanuatu, the Marshall Islands, and “Micronesia” for their bank-
ing secrecy (US Senate 1990a, 62). 
Even publications for ofc promoters and clients claimed that Vanuatu’s
offshore companies were registered without any requirement for charac-
ter references or checks of Interpol’s lists of criminal subjects (Offshore
Centres Report, Autumn 1994). Tax haven promoter William Hill saw
Nauru and Vanuatu as attracting money launderers—many of whom he
considered to be romantics intrigued by such exotic locales (1994, 66–68).
This bad image among some financiers showed no signs of disappearing,
as indicated by an article in the 4 August 1997 issue of The American
Banker, which labeled Vanuatu as one of four “quasi-outlaw banking
centers.”
In February 1998 the Financial Action Task Force on Money Launder-
ing claimed that Vanuatu was increasingly involved in laundering circuits
and that its legislation had created favorable opportunities for launderers
(Australian Financial Review, 17 Feb 1998). In May 1998 the Pacific
Islands offshore centers were criticized in the hearings of the US House of
Representatives, and Niue was especially condemned for providing $5,000
charters for offshore banks—whose titles could be in Russian or Chinese
and which could be used by launderers to gain protected access to the US
financial markets through virtually unsupervised correspondent (bank-to-
bank) accounts (US House of Representatives 1998, 68). In March 1999
the task force observed that a heavy concentration of financial activity
related to Russian organized crime (apparently using US intermediaries)
had been observed, specifically in Western Sämoa,5 Nauru, Vanuatu, and
the Cook Islands (Australian Financial Review, 1 June 2000). 
In March 1999 the US Department of State gave very low ratings to
Nauru, Niue, Vanuatu, Sämoa, Palau, the Cook Islands, the Marshall
Islands, and Tonga (in descending order of criticism) for their actions
against launderers—considerably lower ratings than for nine other off-
shore centers and even inferior to the rating for Russia (US Department
of State 1999). Jonathan M Winer (deputy assistant secretary of state,
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narcotics, and law enforcement during the Clinton administration, and a
frequent expert witness at congressional hearings) declared: “The islands
of the South Pacific, one of the new centers of the world’s offshore indus-
try and, not coincidentally, home to a large percentage of Russia’s offshore
banks . . . have sprouted vigorous financial services industries whose sole
purpose would seem to be financial crime” (1999, 354).
While the details of the US Department of State’s recent investigations
of Pacific Islands havens were never reported in the popular media, Winer
summarized some of the State Department’s findings in an article intended
for a specialist audience (1999). At that time Nauru had registered 288
banks, and its offshore bankers included a number of suspect Russians
and Ukrainians; a Latvian whom Riga authorities were investigating for
allegedly stealing $20 million; a Malaysian who was being investigated for
serving as a conduit for laundering cocaine profits from Cali in Colom-
bia; and an Australian whose occupation was moving large quantities of
Iranian currency. Sämoa had registered only fifteen offshore banks at the
time, but its offshore bankers included a Russian man who was then in jail
in Europe; a Russian who carried both Honduran and Russian passports
and had registered about three hundred offshore companies in Sämoa; a
Russian and a Greek whom Maltese authorities had arrested for forgery,
misappropriating funds, and operating a bank that had not been licensed;
a notorious Ukrainian; a suspect Lebanese based in Beirut; a Swiss banker
of whom Swiss authorities had an unflattering view; another man with a
criminal record in Switzerland; and some offshore bankers who listed false
addresses in the United States. Among Cook Islands offshore bankers were
some politicians from Brazil who were under investigation in that coun-
try for laundering the proceeds of drug trafficking; six suspect Paraguay-
ans; several Russians whose operations were headquartered in Cyprus;
and some dubious Indonesian banks, such as the Lippo Group, which
was accused of laundering money and being involved in unlawful cam-
paign contributions in relation to the 1996 US presidential election.
Finally, Cook Islands offshore bankers included members of a notorious
Italian family that was under investigation by authorities in Italy in rela-
tion to assaults, conspiracies, contraband, receiving, banking and currency
offenses, company offenses, illegal bankruptcies, and frauds.
While Pacific Islands offshore promoters conceded that some of the
regional offshore financial centers had been involved in laundering, they
generally contended that these were exceptional events and that they have
taken appropriate measures against them. Let us consider some cases from
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Vanuatu, the largest offshore center in the region. Drug money has been
laundered in Vanuatu, but government officials and ofc promoters there
have also cooperated with metropolitan police. In 1989 the Vanuatu par-
liament passed laws criminalizing money laundering and allowing for
fines, prison sentences of up to fifteen years, confiscation of assets, mutual
assistance in criminal matters, and extradition.
Richard Carpenter, the British barrister who was Vanuatu’s financial
services commissioner from 1992 to 1995, said that while in Washington
dc, he asked Senator Kerry to prove his allegations that Port Vila had
laundered money, but apparently Kerry refused to provide any evidence
(Islands Business Pacific, July 1994). Ian Smith, when he was manager of
the Westpac Bank and chairman of the Vanuatu Finance Centre Associa-
tion (the principal ofc promotional organization there), made the often-
repeated claim in Port Vila that the US attack was “malicious bullying”
that had little or nothing to do with drugs. Instead it was said to result
from the frustrations of US governmental agencies when they failed to
obtain confidential information from members of the finance center who
were concerned to defend its integrity (Vanuatu Weekly, 18 May 1990). 
Port Vila’s offshore promoters may even appear to be more scrupulous
than members of the metropolitan legal profession, at least when it relates
to a transfer of money from Vanuatu. A Vanuatu trust company raised
objections to a Brisbane law firm’s attempts to gain access to funds of
clients who had been accused of the trafficking of a$11.4 million of hash-
ish in Australia between 1985 and 1987. They had laundered most of the
proceeds through companies created in Vanuatu’s offshore center—either
with bank checks posted to Vanuatu companies under the control of syn-
dicate members or cash carried on Lear Jet flights from Queensland for
deposit in a Port Vila bank. In what some have seen as over-lawyering,
the firm billed well over a$1 million to litigate the case, even though the
chief defendants apparently had wanted to plead guilty for over a year.
Responding to a bill from the Brisbane lawyers, Melitco, a trust company
in Vanuatu, was reluctant to pay the law firm with funds that may have
been laundered proceeds of drug trafficking. Melitco stated, “It was not
our business to protect drug dealers . . . the whole matter smells as far as
Melitco is concerned.” This was countered by the legal firm’s instruc-
tions: “please remit forthwith all funds” (abc 1993).
However, the conception that, to hire their own lawyers, defendants in
Australia should be able to use assets subject to a restraining order for
money laundering was solidified by an Australian Court of Appeal deci-
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sion. This decision concerned another drug trafficker who laundered
some of his proceeds through the Vanuatu offshore center, Ian Hall Saxon
(nswlr 1992). In 1989 Saxon was at the center of Australia’s largest
detected case of money laundering (involving a$77 million) from the pro-
ceeds of trafficking hashish or cannabis resin with a street value of a$100
million to a$120 million. Several of this former rock-tour promoter’s
principal partners (including a Colombian-born naturalized American
gold dealer with connections to Vanuatu) were sentenced to long terms of
imprisonment (of ten to fifteen years) for illegal drug importation or
money laundering. The National Crime Authority of Australia and the
Australian Federal Police received cooperation from the government of
Vanuatu after they identified its offshore financial center as a recipient of
funds.
In another case, over the course of a few weeks in mid-July 1999, Van-
uatu’s European Bank received $7.5 million from the illicit proceeds of one
of the greatest credit card frauds in history. The criminally derived funds
had been forwarded to Port Vila from the Cayman Islands offshore center.
European Bank officials (including bank president Tom Bayer) claimed
that they were suspicious and alerted the police in May 1999. After Cay-
man Islands police closed down a bank associated with laundering the
funds, a Vanuatu court froze the money in late July 1999. The US District
Court of California ordered that the money be returned to reimburse
900,000 people worldwide whom a Malibu company had billed for over
$49 million of Internet services (including pornography) that they did not
order. Conflicts with the United States emerged over a freeze order by the
Vanuatu Public Prosecutor’s Office—creating the possibility that the Van-
uatu government might confiscate and retain the funds (Pacific Islands
Monthly, Jan 2000). 
In February 2001 the minority (Democrat) staff of the US Senate Per-
manent Subcommittee on Investigations issued a widely publicized report
titled Correspondent Banking: A Gateway to Money Laundering, which
used this Vanuatu example as one of ten case studies (US Senate 2001a).
Its version of events contrasted with the statements of offshore promoters
in Vanuatu. According to the US Senate report and subsequent testimony
at Senate hearings, the European Bank soon knew that the $7.5 million
was suspect, but it did nothing about it for two months and it failed to
notify the office of its correspondent bank, Citibank, in Sydney. It trans-
ferred the money from Citibank to a Vanuatu bank after the US govern-
ment filed a suit to freeze the $7.5 million in Australia (US Senate 2001a;
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2001b). While this story was circulated in metropolitan countries among
very powerful people, Bayer’s response was confined to the local media.
Bayer reiterated that the European Bank had taken the first action to
freeze the funds and added that US authorities had retained a “bounty
hunter” who arrived in Vanuatu in August 1999 and obtained another
freeze order. According to Bayer, Vanuatu authorities have been assisting
the United States, and the delay in the case had been caused by the Van-
uatu Public Prosecutor’s view that the US prosecutor would fail because
of lack of proper evidence (Vanuatu Trading Post, 24 Feb 2001). 
Nauru and the Bank of New York Scandal
Of all Pacific tax havens, Nauru has been the most closely associated with
the largest money laundering case in world history, the Bank of New
York’s so-called “Russiagate” scandal. The Bank of New York is a major
international bank, founded by Alexander Hamilton in 1784, a hallowed
pillar of the US establishment. Its name connotes its central position in
the most important city for global finance, which has meant that its activ-
ities are closely covered in the media. The bank’s problems began in the
summer of 1998 when a competitor, the Republic National Bank of New
York, reported to the US Treasury about suspicious transactions involv-
ing the Bank of New York. Republic was under suspicion for its own
extensive Russian operations (Friedman 2000, 219–225). 
On 19 August 1999 the New York Times (arguably the most respected
and influential US news medium) broke the story of the Bank of New York
scandal—its possible laundering of billions of dollars that it received from
Russia, often through offshore intermediaries. Law enforcement agencies
contended that the bank case involved at least 87,000 electronic transfers
of up to $15 billion (some for capital flight, some for tax evasion, but also
some from criminal activities such as contract murder, narcotics traffick-
ing, and prostitution). They identified their problem as getting cooperation
from foreign jurisdictions—especially some of the secretive and remote
Pacific Islands. Of these recalcitrants, Nauru was the most criticized.
Nauru’s Sinex Bank alone was reported to have deposited $3 billion at the
Bank of New York (Australian, 31 March 2001), and half of the bank’s
funds from Russia were said to have gone through Nauru. dkb, the Rus-
sian parent of Sinex, had a questionable client base; Lucy Edwards, the
Bank of New York vice president who entered a guilty plea to charges of
money laundering, conceded: “I was aware that personnel from dkb were
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on occasion . . . afraid to leave the bank because they said customers with
machine guns were waiting for them” (New York Times Magazine, 10
Dec 2000).
The Bank of New York scandal crystallized western moral outrage. As
Russia lurched from one crisis to another and its people became increas-
ingly impoverished and anti-American, its corrupt leaders were presented
as stealing western aid and Russia’s resources and using banks in remote
Pacific Islands offshore centers (employing their correspondent relations
to channel funds into western banks) to complete the fraud—with the risk
that the Russian elite would increasingly corrupt the United States and its
European allies. 
Nauru’s position was further damaged when Victor Melnikov, deputy
chairman of the Russian Central Bank, stated that $70 billion had been
transferred to Nauru from Russia in 1998, compared to total Russian
exports of $74 billion. In March 1999 Alexander Pochinok, head of the
Russian Finance Department, claimed that 90 percent of Russian banks
maintained 6,600 offshore banking accounts in Nauru, which was receiv-
ing $10 billion of Russian flight capital each month (Banks and Exchanges
Weekly, 22 March 1999; Moscow Times, 30 March 1999; Prime Tass, 29
March 1999; Segodnya, 12 March 1999). 
Initially, these announcements about Nauru did not have much impact
on the western media, until the influential Washington Post made this
Nauru story the centerpiece of its front page story, “Russians Use Tiny
Island to Hide Billions,” on 28 October 1999—reviving and giving a new
slant to the Bank of New York story that had been front-page news from
mid-August to early October 1999. The notion of $70 billion of Russian
money being sent to the Nauru “laundry” in one year simplified the com-
plex issue of Pacific Islands offshore centers into an easily understood
form that attracted public and political attention and elevated the issue
on the international policy agenda. Nauru’s $70 billion from Russia was
a “trigger event,” a cue to action (Dearing and Rogers 1996, 77–87).
Other centers in the Pacific Islands were soon implicated, and banks that
had been heavily involved in Russia came under pressure to do something
to repair their reputations.
The increasing panic about capital flight from the former Soviet Union
soon involved Palau and Vanuatu, although these two Pacific Islands
countries did not receive nearly as much media attention as Nauru. On
23 August 1999 Russia increased surveillance and control over illegal cur-
rency transfers to Palau even before action was taken in October 1999
246 the contemporary pacific • fall 2003
against Mosprom, a Palau-registered bank. Latvian tellers at Mosprom
had reportedly received at least $50 million at its Moscow office, which
was allegedly designed to expedite illegal tax evasion and capital flight.
Russian authorities were confined to taking indirect action against Mos-
prom, because its Russian office was in a hotel located in the compound
of the Latvian Embassy in Moscow and hence was protected by diplo-
matic immunity (Baltic Business Weekly, 26, 31 Oct 1999; Komersant, 27
Oct 1999; Trud, 26 Oct 1999). Vanuatu was targeted when the central
bank in Ukraine stated that Palau and Vanuatu were, respectively, the
second and fourth most popular offshore centers for massive capital flight
(bbc, 12 Nov 1999; Infobank, 11 Nov 1999).
In December 1999 it was reported that on 17 November 1999 the Bank
of New York, the Republic Bank of New York, Deutsche Bank, and its
newly acquired subsidiary Bankers Trust had suspended all US dollar
transactions with Nauru, Palau, and Vanuatu because these countries were
allegedly not taking sufficient precautions to prevent money laundering
through their offshore financial centers. This was the first time that these
banks had taken such independent and unprecedented action against any
country. In January 2001 Niue became the target of JP Morgan Chase
and the Bank of New York, which refused to have financial dealings with
the country. Both banks had recently been criticized in the US Senate for
what they were accusing Niue of—taking inadequate measures against
laundering. There had been media reports that Niue was laundering
money for cocaine traffickers and that its offshore entities were involved
in “letters of guarantee” frauds.
Four relatively small Pacific Islands havens (rather than the larger off-
shore centers in which these six banks had prominent offices) were being
singled out for special attention. In Port Vila, anz Bank (though not
Westpac Bank) reported feeling some impact from the four metropolitan
banks’ sanctions (Australian Financial Review, 27 Jan 2000). However,
there were doubts expressed as to whether JP Morgan Chase and the
Bank of New York actually imposed a general embargo on Niue, or
whether it had confined itself to blocking only transfers of funds to the
Niue government from the offices of Mossack Fonseca, the Panamanian
law firm that has exclusive rights to register Niue’s offshore companies
(Cook Islands News, 28 March 2001). In any case, while the sanctions
might adversely affect Pacific countries (not least with reputational dam-
age), they would have little effect on many of the offshore entities regis-
tered there since these maintained accounts in metropolitan banks.
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Julian Ala, then the head of Vanuatu’s Financial Services Commission,
said that the four banks had not responded to his requests for explana-
tions of their reasons for imposing the bans. Port Vila’s leading offshore
promoter, Tom Bayer, led a delegation from Vanuatu to the United States
in late January 2000, meeting representatives of the sanctioning banks, the
Federal Reserve, the US State Department, and the International Mone-
tary Fund (imf). Bayer contended that no one at the US banks knew any-
thing about Vanuatu’s anti-laundering activities (eg, that Vanuatu had
been one of the first countries to criminalize laundering), but (being under
pressure to be seen to take action) they picked a small, unknown, and dis-
tant target with which they did no substantial business. Bayer further
emphasized that the misleading negative publicity about Vanuatu was
created purposely because the country had asserted its independence from
control by foreign powers. Nevertheless, Port Vila’s proactive approach
was well received at all the US banks and government departments,
which received substantial “fact files” (including legislation and details of
supervision) from the offshore promoters. Vanuatu agreed to a US State
Department visit to the country in late February 2000 and a weeklong
evaluation of its offshore center in March by the Asian Pacific Group on
Money Laundering (an fatf affiliate). It encouraged a UK international
banking examiner to come to Port Vila to inspect offshore banks with
Russian connections. Vanuatu’s offshore promoters saw their cooperative
approach as being successful. The four banks dropped their sanctions
against Vanuatu, but some of the correspondent banks, which had been
notified by the four that they should also stop transacting with Vanuatu,
maintained sanctions that were still in force over one and a half years
later.6
Nauru’s approach was less diplomatic and open than Vanuatu’s. Nau-
ru’s President René Harris was ignoring the growing concerns about laun-
dering. “What’s it got to do with you?” he angrily asked a Washington
Post reporter before hanging up. He later did the same to a group of top
Pacific Islands authorities, adding that the real problem rested with Europe
and North America because they were buying the services—drugs and
prostitution—that others were profiting from (Pacific Islands Monthly,
Jan 2000). While Nauru’s Finance Minister Kinza Clodumar agreed that
Nauru needed stronger anti-laundering measures and that US experts
should assist the country in reviewing its banking laws, he also contended
that the majority of the money laundering connected with Nauru banks
had actually been performed in the United States and Europe and that
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enacting anti–money laundering legislation did not have high priority for
his country’s parliament (Radio Australia, 28 Jan 2000). Nauru was
reported to have demanded $10 million from the United States to reform
its offshore center (Age, 15 March 2001; New York Times Magazine, 10
Dec 2000). 
Palau’s strategy was similar to Vanuatu’s. Palau strongly denied that it
was involved in laundering and claimed it was not clear why it had been
cited. Government representatives noted that a US Bureau for Interna-
tional Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs report earlier in the year
did not have Palau on its watch-list and that the US government had never
listed Palau as an area of concern. They expressed shock that the four
banks would launch such sanctions without any serious investigation. But
after the Palau government sued the Bank of New York, the bank replied
that at least six questionable banks were registered in Palau and that one
of them had handled over $1.7 billion in transactions over an eighteen-
month period. Despite the controversy and further questions about the
country’s twenty-seven banks (in 1999—with four new banks added in
2000), Palau (like Vanuatu) successfully managed public relations on the
money laundering issue, eagerly seeking advice from the US government
and the International Monetary Fund and passing new banking legislation
in October 2000 and June 2001.7 In late 1999 and 2000 the more suc-
cessful offshore centers learned how to play a new game—in a very short
time moving from the language of marketing, self-promotion, and advo-
cacy to the language of international diplomacy (Offshore Investment,
June 2001). 
Niue followed Nauru’s more confrontational approach. Sani Lakatani,
the premier of Niue, accused the international community of using bully-
ing tactics. In response to Lakatani’s claim that the US Treasury had used
its influence to prevent US banks from doing business with Niue, a trea-
sury representative said it had merely advised them to be careful (Dow
Jones International News, 8 May 2001). Lakatani’s accusation followed
his suggestion that if the g-7 countries were serious about opposing
money laundering they should consider contributing several million dol-
lars a year to Niue’s budget in exchange for it closing its offshore finan-
cial center (Vanuatu Weekly, 11 March 2000).
Further revelations consolidated the negative image of Pacific Islands
havens. In December 1999 the Nauru-registered Cassaf Bank was reported
to have provided at least some of the capital for Mosprom (the Palau-
chartered bank that rented premises at the Latvian embassy) and to be the
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secret channel for substantial illegal capital flight and tax evasion schemes.
Prosecutors claimed that Cassaf had at least 1,500 clients (who needed a
special pass to be admitted to the small private Moscow apartment where
it was located), including oil tycoons, underground liquor producers, and
organized crime chiefs. Cassaf was said to have handled tens of billions of
dollars of deposits even though it did not have permission to operate in
Russia. The Cassaf case led to a very high-profile financial crimes trial
from June 2001 to January 2002 in Moscow, where the Nauru connection
was frequently discussed. In the end, Cassaf ’s former president and four
employees were convicted of illegally removing $300 million of undeclared
funds from Russia, but were granted immediate amnesty, while charges
of money laundering, counterfeiting, and associating with criminal groups
were dropped (Agence France-Presse, 31 Jan 2002; Komersant, 18 Feb
2000; 7 June 2001; Moscow Times, 1 Feb 2002; Segodnya, 11 Dec 1999). 
A German version of the Bank of New York scandal emerged in the
media in 2001 with reports that Russian companies in 1999 used the
United Global Bank in Sämoa (which is no longer registered there as an
offshore bank) to transfer dm1.2 billion to the West Deutsche Landesbank
as part of dm7 billion that Russians deposited there (Der Speigel, 15 Jan
2001). This was soon followed by the announcement in February 2001
that the Ukrainian tax police had completed an investigation in which they
accused the country’s former deputy prime minister and current opposi-
tion politician, Ms Yulia Tymoshenko, of arranging the illegal transfer (via
Latvia) of about $1 billion from United Energy Systems of Ukraine to the
Nauru-based First Trading Bank (controlled by Ukraine’s former Prime
Minister Pavlo Lazarenko) when she was the head of United Energy dur-
ing 1996–1997. The $1 billion transfer was to have purchased Russian
gas, and the failure to pay for the gas later hurt relations between Russia
and Ukraine. The tax police charged that the gas funds had been trans-
ferred to the private accounts of Tymoshenko, Lazarenko, and others—
who denied the charges, claiming that they were politically motivated
(Infobank Ukraine, 5 Feb 2001; Interfax, 4 Feb 2001). Numerous reports
of other multimillion-dollar frauds linked to Nauru offshore banks (but
not necessarily connected with the former USSR) appeared in newspapers
around the world from 1999 onward. 
The disparagement of Pacific Islands countries was sometimes general-
ized beyond attacks on money laundering. London’s Independent on Sun-
day characterized the “blacklisted haven, the tiny Pacific offshore island
of Niue” as “little more than an accretion of bird guano” (4 March 2001,
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5)—seeming to confuse Niue with Nauru, which was later described as
“little more than a phosphate mine” (Reuters, 25 June 2001). Vanuatu
was inaccurately belittled as “a tiny rock sticking out of the Pacific” (Time
Magazine, 22 Oct 2001). Reporters made a habit of denigrating Pacific
Islands offshore financial centers, which they presented as deviant and
obstructing the expanding battle against money laundering. The Nauru
story was often repeated and embellished over time, for instance by the
Manchester (UK) Guardian: “Nauru . . . an eight-square-mile lump of
coral reef covered with fossilised bird droppings . . . has changed itself
into the world’s premier banking regime purpose-designed for criminals”
(23 June 2001, 15). The Economist speculated, “Presumably, it [Nauru]
is by now a holiday destination for Russians and tax accountants” (23
June 2000). Reports added South American drug dealers to the Russian
Mafia as important clients of Nauru’s offshore center (Islands Business,
Feb 2000), which was labeled as a safe haven for the proceeds of drug
trafficking, people smuggling, prostitution, and other rackets by gangs in
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Sunday Times, Lon-
don, 5 Dec 1999). The media’s aura of independence and impartiality
tended to legitimate the attacks on Pacific Islands offshore centers.
While large banks, the US government, and international organizations
obtained regular access to the global mass media, Pacific Islands offshore
financial centers did not—especially as the islands’ centers have a history
of avoiding inquiry and defending financial secrecy. Protesting Pacific
Islands countries were often not taken as seriously as those who made the
charges, and reports of the complaints of relatively un-newsworthy Pacific
Islands offshore promoters were almost entirely confined to the regional
media of Oceania. The effects of the accusations against Pacific Islands
havens were strengthened when a very important agenda-setting person
and a dominant newspaper were both involved, as when the Wall Street
Journal reported that US Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers identi-
fied Nauru as one of the four most popular destinations for the proceeds
of crime and suggested that the passage of the Clinton administration’s
anti-laundering bill would give him the power to prohibit transactions
between US banks and such offshore centers (2 March 2000). 
Newspapers and other media around the world repeated the Washing-
ton Post’s account of Nauru’s $70 billion from Russia, if only in very short
briefs. The story continued to be newsworthy for years—as exemplified
in a long article and colorful pictorial on the Nauru offshore center
appearing in the New York Times Magazine on 10 December 2000 and
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numerous media references to it during 2001 and 2002. This helped to
support the anti–tax haven policy agenda. Government officials and politi-
cians often interpret the amount of media attention to an issue as an indi-
rect expression of public interest (Linsky 1986). 
The Clinton Administration
In the eyes of members of the Clinton administration, the case of Nauru
“laundering” tens of billions of dollars highlighted the threat posed by
the anarchic international system. Even the powerful US government
could not control the illicit activities of such small countries, much less the
more traditional challenge represented by Russia for most of the twenti-
eth century.
The image of the sudden prominence of remote Pacific havens in laun-
dering excused many of the past failures of the US Departments of Trea-
sury and Justice, the Internal Revenue Service, the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation, and Customs to deal with the problem (since the new threat had
taken the novel form of Russians in Oceania rather than, say, the more
traditional images of Colombians in Caribbean offshore financial centers).
All these governmental organizations gave testimony at US congressional
hearings in support of new Clinton administration legislation to broaden
the definition of laundering and impose stricter controls over transactions
with offshore centers. The new Russian–Pacific Islands threat served to
justify granting new powers (and budgetary allotments) to these govern-
ment departments, which had during the final years of the Clinton admin-
istration begun to create the appearance of unity and common purpose.
In the first major joint report on anti-laundering strategies by Treasury and
Justice (US Departments of Treasury and Justice 2000), they explicitly
linked laundering, tax avoidance, and a weakening of the global financial
architecture as related problems for national and international organiza-
tions to pursue with offshore centers.
The primary purpose of the proposed law (the International Counter–
Money Laundering Act of 2000) was to allow the secretary of the trea-
sury to restrict or even prohibit US financial institutions’ ability to trans-
act with selected foreign countries or financial institutions. The changes
would involve the expansion of the definition of laundering to cover for-
eign offenses,8 and the extraterritorial extension of many of the key ele-
ments of US anti-laundering laws—forcing offshore centers to abandon
financial secrecy for their clients if they wanted access to the US banking
252 the contemporary pacific • fall 2003
system. The existing laws criminalized US laundering of the proceeds from
only three types of foreign crime—drug trafficking, bank fraud, and vio-
lent crimes linked to terrorism. The Clinton administration (with the sup-
port of moderate Republicans such as James Leach, chairman of the
House Committee on Banking and Financial Services from the tradition-
ally anti-bank state of Iowa) sought to define many more foreign crimes as
predicate offenses for laundering. This was intended to limit the volume of
foreign criminal proceeds flowing into the US financial system (US House
of Representatives 1999, 16) and to allow the United States to assist for-
eigners in the way that it asked foreigners to assist the United States in
anti-laundering actions (US House of Representatives 2000b, 8–9). The
voluntary actions of the six US banks against Pacific Islands havens took
the same form that supporters of the bill were attempting to legislate. 
But there was considerable opposition to the new initiatives, which
sought to regulate the porous boundaries and unrestricted financial flows
favored by free market advocates of globalization, including most Repub-
lican congressmen. Democrats supporting new controls over offshore cen-
ters attempted to appeal to Republicans by framing the problem in terms
of drugs and a new Cold War against (Russian) organized crime, which
would necessarily require some abridgement of the principles of a per-
fectly free market. Laundering and financial crimes were identified as the
“dark side of globalization” (US House of Representatives 2000b, 10).
The new Russian threat was connected with Pacific Islands offshore
centers. It drew on fear of organized crime (the new Russian Mafia) and
moralized neo–Cold War images (the new Russian elite of criminal bil-
lionaires and corrupt politicians working in collaboration with the suc-
cessor to the kgb). The fear was that they were contaminating the US
economy and politics through secret ofc channels, particularly in the
Pacific Islands, from which they could send their money into the United
States without its dangerous source ever being identified. R James Wool-
sey, former cia director, testified in congressional hearings that Russian
capital flight and laundering had the potential to corrupt US institutions,
destabilize Russia, and increase anti-American sentiments there. Woolsey
concluded that too much power to formulate policy toward Russia had
been given to orthodox economists, who overemphasized the virtues of
free markets and colluded in covering up the importance of Russian orga-
nized crime and corruption because they did not have the analytical tools
to deal with this serious problem (US House of Representatives 2000a,
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61–67). A prompt extension of state power was seen as warranted to deal
with this pressing, insidious, and ever more dangerous peril—the laun-
dering that the Clinton administration declared a national security threat.
The Pacific Islands were seen as a new danger. Leach said, “Money laun-
dering . . . has become as large an issue in international politics as there
is. . . . [I]n recent years, authorities in this country have noted a migra-
tion of unsavory operators from havens in the Caribbean to remote
islands of the South Pacific, such as . . . Nauru, that did not even register
on their collective radar screen five years ago” (US House of Representa-
tives 2000c, 4, 30). Nauru and Vanuatu were repeatedly mentioned as
laundering havens (eg, US House of Representatives 2000a, 90, 322;
2000c, 27).
Congressional hearings on Russian money laundering (relying particu-
larly on testimony from those associated with the Central Intelligence
Agency [cia]) constructed a vision of how the new Russian threat had
evolved out of the kgb and the former USSR. The clandestine theft of Rus-
sia’s assets began as early as 1985 when key members of the Soviet Com-
munist Party anticipated the collapse of communism and turned to the
kgb to move precious metals, stones, art, and liquid assets abroad. By
1989 many Communist Party and kgb leaders had already become capi-
talists. The former kgb leaders were as powerful in post-communist Rus-
sia as they had been in the old USSR. They were experts in large-scale
money laundering through their banks, which have become the channels
for the theft of Russia’s national assets. In the US House of Representa-
tives hearings Vladimir Putin (now the president of Russia) was portrayed
as a major player in the looting of the Russian state over a number of
years and as having overseen kgb capital flight operations—rebuffing the
Duma’s attempts to investigate them. The media later reported that Putin
had launched an extensive personal investigation into deals involving
Nauru’s offshore center during the summer of 1999, shortly after he
became the director of the Russian Federal Security Service, formerly the
kgb (Fortune International, 24 Jan 2000). By the mid-1990s, 70 to 80
percent of Russia’s private banks were said to be controlled by organized
criminals. Secrecy havens in the Pacific Islands were presented as reposi-
tories for funds illegally taken out of Russia—providing cover and safety
from threats of retrieval by subsequent Russian governments as well as
funds to purchase western banks and business and to buy political influ-
ence in the United States (US House of Representatives 2000a).
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International Actions and Reactions
In the late 1990s, the left-of-center governments of the United States,
France, and Germany led international organizations toward a much more
aggressive attack on offshore financial centers. In 2000 international orga-
nizations began blacklisting offshore centers and threatening them with
sanctions. This involved challenging financial secrecy provisions, which
are useful to both money launderers and tax evaders. Because laundering
generally provokes more public indignation than tax minimization (but
see Wishart 1995 and 1999 for the outrage in New Zealand about the
Cook Islands “Winebox Affair”), laundering has been the most promi-
nent ostensible theme of the anti-ofc campaign. The quest to “take the
profit out of crime” was targeting bankers, lawyers, accountants, and pro-
fessional advisors (who created offshore structures for their clients), just
as much as more conventional criminals. In the face of a coming crisis of
welfare provision for a rapidly aging population, the anti–tax haven
movement was particularly attractive to social democratic governments
that opposed the wealthy escaping taxation (Avi-Yonah 2000; Bosworth-
Davies 1997; Samuels and Kolb 2001). Law enforcement agencies, former
Cold Warriors and spies were offered prominent roles in the campaign,
as well as the confiscated assets of the accused (Naylor 1999). All this was
coordinated by international organizations demanding legal and admin-
istrative reform in offshore centers (see table 1).
Financial Stability Forum
The first direct assault on Pacific Islands offshore financial centers from an
international organization came on 5 April 2000 when the Financial Sta-
bility Forum (fsf) claimed that the Cook Islands, the Marshall Islands,
Nauru, Niue, Sämoa, and Vanuatu were among twenty-five offshore cen-
ters that had the lowest quality of financial supervision (placing them in
“Group III”).9 They were therefore considered weak links in an increas-
ingly globalized financial system, capable of provoking an international
monetary crisis. The forum sharply differentiated Pacific Islands offshore
centers from “Group I” offshore centers (eg, Hong Kong, Luxembourg,
Singapore, and Switzerland), which it said were well supervised, cooper-
ative, and of no danger to global financial stability. 
The Financial Stability Forum suggested that countries that did not
comply with its standards might face tighter criteria for obtaining loans
and funds from international bodies. However, the sanctions threatened
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by the forum were relatively minor; it set no deadline for sanctions; and
the issue could be temporized. The International Monetary Fund was
given responsibility for consulting with Pacific Islands other offshore cen-
ters in “Group III” (fsf 2000), despite the fact that some of them were
not imf members. 
ofc promoters criticized the fsf report for being merely a collection
of anecdotal views of a number of metropolitan onshore regulators (The
Lawyer, 4 June 2001). Conservatives berated fsf paternalism: “Some
places do have dangers but companies are grown-ups which can call on
expert advice and so are in a position to decide whether the risk is worth
the savings and the convenience of lower regulatory burdens” (Daily Tele-
graph, 29 June 2000, 74).
Financial Action Task Force
On 22 June 2000 the world’s leading anti–money laundering agency, the
Financial Action Task Force (fatf), published a blacklist of fifteen coun-
tries considered to be uncooperative in the fight against laundering, includ-
ing four Pacific Islands offshore financial centers: the Cook Islands, the
Table 1. Organizations at One Time Blacklisting Pacific Islands Tax Havens,
1999–2001
Organizations
Private Banks FSF1 FATF2 OECD3
Nauru • • • •
Niue • • • •
Cook Islands • • •
Marshall Islands • • •
Vanuatu • • •
Sämoa • •
Tonga •
Palau •
1 Financial Stability Forum
2 Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering
3 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
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Marshall Islands, Nauru, and Niue.10 As a first step, the task force called
on all member countries to ask their financial institutions to give special
attention to transactions with parties connected to these jurisdictions.
Sanctions from member countries were threatened against jurisdictions
remaining on the fatf blacklist in June 2001. The proposed measures
included restriction or prohibition of all financial transactions with the
blacklisted jurisdictions.
Pacific Islands offshore financial centers were attractive targets because
they had relatively little power to oppose the measures being taken against
them. Compared to some other havens that were not blacklisted, they
were less likely to serve powerful transnational companies or the old rich
and they had a larger proportion of Russian and overseas Chinese clients,
who had relatively little political leverage or ability to retaliate through
the media.
Some contended that Pacific Islands offshore centers were dispropor-
tionately stigmatized not because they were necessarily more prone to
laundering than some jurisdictions that were not named and shamed but
because of their lack of powerful allies. Intensive lobbying by France was
said to be responsible for the exclusion of Monaco from the fatf black-
list. The United Kingdom insisted that Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands,
Gibraltar, Guernsey, the Isle of Man, and Jersey not be included, but it had
to concede the Cayman Islands (which was listed in June 2000 but later
removed from the blacklist in June 2001). Canada successfully intervened
to have the Caribbean countries that it represents at the International
Monetary Fund (Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, and St Lucia) dropped
from the blacklist. Mexico, an fatf member country that is sometimes
considered to be a major non-ofc laundering center, interceded to help
Panama, which was removed from the blacklist in June 2001 (Indepen-
dent, London, 23 June 2000; Los Angeles Times, 23 June 2000; Wall
Street Journal, 26 June 2000). The military importance of a notorious off-
shore center such as Panama gives it greater latitude to launder money
(Hampton and Levi 1999), whereas being aid-dependent, lacking signifi-
cant military power, having relatively few large corporate sponsors, and
not being strategically central makes an offshore financial center vulner-
able to blacklisting (sometimes on flimsy evidence). 
The Cook Islands (like Niue and the Marshall Islands) quickly took
action to get off the fatf blacklist. Rarotonga passed anti–money laun-
dering legislation in August 2000 and later committed itself to a regional
framework for combating money laundering by joining the Asia Pacific
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Group on Money Laundering, a sort of branch of the Financial Action
Task Force, in May 2001 (Money Laundering Monitor, July 2001). But
on 22 June 2001 all four Pacific Islands offshore centers remained on the
revised fatf blacklist of seventeen jurisdictions. The task force recom-
mended that transactions with the Cook Islands, the Marshall Islands, and
Niue should continue to be scrutinized (fatf 2001). Nauru was consid-
ered to have made no significant progress and was reported to be one of
the three worst offenders in the world (the other two being Russia and the
Philippines). Of these three severely stigmatized countries, Nauru got the
worst press. While there was media coverage of the Russian and Philip-
pines embassies taking issue with the fatf attacks on their countries’ mea-
sures against money laundering, “Nauru does not have an embassy in
Washington, and the ambassador at the mission to the United Nations
was not available for comment” (Washington Post, 23 June 2001).
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
In 1998 the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(oecd) created the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices, which identified
forty-seven tax havens. oecd members Luxembourg and Switzerland
(both very large offshore financial centers) abstained from the process.
Each non-oecd tax haven was encouraged to signal that it would curtail
“harmful tax practices”—allowing the possibility that it would not be
included on the first published oecd blacklist. Six countries (none in the
Pacific Islands) quickly complied, and the oecd forum unilaterally
removed six other countries after it was satisfied that they were not prac-
ticing “harmful tax competition”—including the Pacific Island state of
Tuvalu.11
The first oecd blacklist was published on 26 June 2000 and consisted
of thirty-five countries, including seven in the Pacific Islands—the Cook
Islands, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Sämoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu
—but not oecd members Switzerland and Luxembourg. The organiza-
tion threatened economic sanctions against blacklisted countries if they
did not meet three conditions: increase financial disclosure and exchange
of information by July 2001, set out by the end of 2001 a two-year time-
table for dismantling their most harmful tax practices, and commit them-
selves to effective exchange of information on all tax matters by the end
of 2005. Although all oecd members were reportedly committed to elim-
inating specified features of harmful tax competition by April 2003, those
members that failed to comply were not threatened with sanctions. Sanc-
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tions against noncompliant non-oecd members might include oecd
member nations using domestic tax laws to deny all deductions, exemp-
tions, allowances, and other credits for taxpayers or entities doing busi-
ness there; imposing civil and criminal penalties to require new, extensive
reporting of all activity involving it; introducing new withholding taxes on
payments or transfers to such a center; and increasing tax audits on all
offshore business activity associated with it (oecd 2000).
A few more countries stated their intention to cooperate fully with
oecd requirements after the blacklist was published. There was a notable
tendency for offshore financial centers with low levels of sovereignty
(particularly British or Dutch territories) to comply, while independent
countries such as Vanuatu tended to put up the strongest resistance (see
van Fossen 1998). However, independent countries with very small off-
shore centers might also surrender to the oecd demands. In August 2001
Tonga repealed its offshore banking legislation and became one of five
countries removed from the blacklist since June 2000—the others being
the Seychelles, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba (both Dutch territo-
ries), and the UK territory of the Isle of Man (AFX News, 23 Aug 2001).
The possible fatf sanctions could destroy an offshore center, but of the
three international organizations, the Organisation for Economic Cooper-
ation and Development posed the greatest threat and the most troubling
dilemma to the largest number of Pacific Islands centers—and, moreover,
seemed to be the dominant international organization. The newborn
Financial Stability Forum was just finding its way, but the coinciding
oecd and fatf memberships (despite formal administrative separation,
their headquarters were in the same building in Paris); the short interval
between their reports; and the frequent confusion in the media between
tax minimization and laundering, all consolidated the impression among
ofc promoters that the anti-laundering campaign was primarily aimed at
the tax advantages offered by offshore centers. Proposed oecd sanctions
for “harmful tax practices” seemed massive and imminent. Yet acquies-
cence to the oecd demands seemed to threaten an offshore center with
rapid decline. Elements of the conservative press deplored the oecd cam-
paign to “bully [Vanuatu,] a microdot in the South Seas” (Daily Tele-
graph, 1 July 2000, 30), while the pro-oecd Washington Post published
an article entitled “The Threat from Vanuatu” about “one of the biggest
threats to governments”—the increasing difficulties they were facing in
collecting taxes from corporations and the wealthy (Washington Post,
2 July 2000).
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Most Pacific Islands offshore centers became increasingly defiant,
emphasizing that they were sovereign states with rights to determine their
own tax laws and that the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development had no right (in international law) to impose its own tax
rules on them. Vanuatu protested that the organization (consisting of
thirty core countries) was not truly global and that if global tax policy was
to be formulated it should be done by a forum that recognized the sover-
eign equality of states (Offshore Investment, Sept 2001). Palau, which was
not on the oecd blacklist, criticized the international organization’s tax
initiative as an “improper and unacceptable exercise in economic imperi-
alism” (Palau Horizon, 24 Aug 2001). Scholars presented detailed criti-
cisms of the oecd initiative as, among other things, an unacceptable
attack on the principle of sovereignty (Dwyer 2000; Hartman 2001).
Some tax haven promoters proposed that the issue of oecd “fiscal colo-
nialism” should be taken to the UN General Assembly to increase the cost
to oecd political leaders of such policies and practices (Bendelow 2000,
2). In late 1999 the UN Offshore Forum had advocated conciliation with
offshore centers and proposed that the best policy for metropolitan coun-
tries was to offer them assistance rather than threaten them with sanc-
tions (Money Laundering Monitor, Jan 2000). 
Offshore financial centers saw the oecd initiatives as attempts to pro-
tect the privileged positions of its own financial centers (eg, Paris, Frank-
furt, New York) against the increasing incursions of other centers with
comparative tax advantages in a period of growing financial deregulation
and mobility. They insisted that tax competition was the same as any
other type of competition and rewards should go to the most competitive.
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development was
attempting to change the rules of a free market and proposing to enforce
a comprehensive system of protectionism with an array of punitive sanc-
tions. Furthermore the proposed oecd sanctions would violate interna-
tional trade law’s nondiscrimination provisions because they would not
apply to oecd member countries that had similar “harmful tax competi-
tion” features. The oecd offshore centers competed directly with the non-
oecd havens that were being threatened with imminent incapacitation.
It seemed ironic that the states of Montana and Colorado had passed off-
shore banking laws (in 1997 and 1999 respectively) that appeared to vio-
late oecd demands—and that the first offshore bank in the United States
(First Colorado Depository Corp) was opening in 2001, with a second
(First Montana Depository) scheduled to follow—the latter including the
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king of Tonga as a prominent potential investor (Asian Wall Street Jour-
nal, 7 June 2001). Various offshore centers in the Pacific and Caribbean
threatened to take the matter to the World Trade Organization (Money
Laundering Monitor, Aug 2000). 
oecd meetings with Commonwealth, Pacific, Caribbean, and British
Overseas territories in Barbados on 8–9 January 2001 (attended by the
Cook Islands, Vanuatu, and Tonga); with all blacklisted countries in Lon-
don on 23–25 January 2001; with Asia Pacific countries on 15–16 Febru-
ary 2001; and with the seven blacklisted Pacific Islands havens in Suva on
24–28 April 2001 led to increasing dissatisfaction and opposition to the
organization on the part of Pacific Islands and other offshore financial cen-
ters. A thirteen-nation working group (including Vanuatu and the Cook
Islands) was created at the Barbados meeting and charged with seeking a
mutually agreed solution to the impasse. As negotiations reached a stale-
mate in March 2001, non-oecd offshore centers in eleven small and
developing countries (mostly Commonwealth countries—including Van-
uatu and the Cook Islands, with the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat as
an observer) formed the International Tax and Investment Organisation
(Financial Times, 7 June 2001). In the same month Don McKinnon of
New Zealand, the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth (whose mem-
bership includes a large proportion of blacklisted offshore centers)
attacked the oecd approach—saying that it was turning into the world’s
financial policeman and wished to be “prosecutor, judge, jury and jailer”
(New Zealand Herald, 3 March 2001).
The Cook Islands, which (unlike Vanuatu and Sämoa) was on all three
blacklists, increasingly shaped the regional response. The country’s reac-
tion to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
became increasingly defiant. In February and March 2001 the Cook
Islands government announced that it did not accept the terms of the
oecd initiative, that the organization had failed to show any empirical
evidence that offshore financial centers caused any actual harm, and that
the Cook Islands would not meet the oecd deadline of 31 July 2001
(Cook Islands News, 1 March 2001). Cook Islands Prime Minister Dr
Terepai Maoate denied that the Cook Islands was laundering money
(Radio New Zealand International, 12 July 2001);12 criticized the media
for confusing laundering and legitimate international tax competition
(Cook Islands Government Website, 3 April 2001); and described the
oecd demands as a “discriminatory sweep across the face of small island
states struggling to build and uplift themselves” (Money Laundering Mon-
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itor, Jan 2001). Maoate said that the Cook Islands could not possibly close
its offshore center because it was a “huge income earner for the country”
(Pacific Magazine, July 2001).13 He urged Pacific Islands solidarity against
the oecd attack on offshore centers. In May 2001 the Pacific Islands
Forum Secretariat agreed to a unified front—emphasizing that member
countries should only negotiate as a bloc and demanding the removal of
the threat of oecd sanctions (Money Laundering Monitor, June 2001). 
Shift in the United States
For offshore promoters, the disposition of the United States was crucial,
because fsf, fatf, and oecd policies were seen as being US-dominated
(Bendelow 2000, 1). The Marshall Islands, with strong ties to the United
States, protested to Washington, claiming that laundering had never hap-
pened there (Radio New Zealand International, 29 June 2001) and that
accusations by the US State Department that some Marshall Islands firms
were involved with the Russian Mafia were completely unsubstantiated
(Marshall Islands Journal, 23 Feb 2001). 
In the United States, a new organization—closely associated with the
right-wing Heritage Foundation and funded by unnamed wealthy sup-
porters (“The Center for Freedom and Prosperity”)—emerged in October
2000 to fight the oecd initiative. The oecd program was presented as
a ploy to raise global taxes, with politicians from European welfare states
colluding to create a protectionist high taxing cartel (a kind of opec for
bureaucrats); violating international traditions of fiscal sovereignty and
individual financial privacy; and victimizing and impoverishing many
small, less-developed countries with offshore centers.14
The Clinton administration’s anti–tax haven campaign began to falter.
It had two weaknesses: it did not come from the “grassroots,” and the
remoteness of havens (not least in Oceania) meant that they were very
distant from most people’s direct experience and concerns. The Clinton
administration spearheaded the campaign but had difficulty convincing
most Republicans, who, in opposition, appealed to US voters’ more imme-
diate and visceral aversion toward taxes, increased government surveil-
lance, and filling out new forms revealing more personal information. 
Although popular among Democrats, Clinton’s anti-laundering initia-
tives were blocked in the Senate by the chairman of the banking commit-
tee, Phil Gramm, a Republican from Texas, a state where banks feared los-
ing their lucrative cross-border business with Mexico. The advent of the
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conservative George W Bush administration in the United States defused
a number of the oecd threats to offshore centers. Banks and financial
institutions were very significant contributors to his presidential campaign
and President Bush was close to those interests and people with little moti-
vation to eliminate access to tax havens. One frequent barrier to US anti-
ofc activities over the decades has been the lobbying by US banks that
benefit from tax evasion, capital flight, and money laundering by foreign-
ers—since the preeminence of the US dollar as the world’s currency has
resulted in huge flows into their deposit bases (and has helped the United
States to meet its large balance of payments deficits). 
The dominant view in the Republican Party was that anti-ofc mea-
sures had gone too far in compromising people’s due process rights, the
presumption of innocence, and financial privacy, as well as impeding the
global mobility of capital and loading banks and other businesses with
expensive, unnecessary, and ineffective reporting requirements. Represen-
tative Ron Paul of Texas, a Republican who was particularly hostile to
the proposed new anti–money laundering legislation, added that it would
damage relations with countries that hosted offshore centers and that it
would impede progress toward digital money, which would reduce rob-
beries and murders (US House of Representatives 2000c, 76–83). Repub-
licans tended to emphasize the dangers of violent street crime rather than
the relatively invisible offenses performed by the wealthy. 
After Bush became president, doubt arose about the US commitment to
oecd anti–tax haven policies. An unusual combination of Republican
congressmen and all twenty-six members of the Congressional Black Cau-
cus (allying with Caribbean offshore financial centers) urged new Treasury
Secretary Paul O’Neill to withdraw US support for this oecd initiative.
House Majority Leader Richard Armey from Texas characterized the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development as “a global
network of tax police” and many Republicans emphasized that its initia-
tive was not in the national interest because the United States had a lower
tax burden than most oecd countries and was in fact a kind of tax haven
for overseas investors benefiting from tax competition. The Bush admin-
istration had given top priority to cutting taxes and O’Neill was troubled
by the supposition that low income-tax rates were somehow suspect. 
On 10 May 2001 the Bush administration attacked two of the three
basic principles of the oecd initiative—the goals of reducing global tax
competition and ending discriminatory tax regimes. The administration
also sought to confine international information exchanges to specific
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cases. The oecd initiative was seen as floundering (or at the point of col-
lapse) after the United States withdrew its support (Global Information
Network, 7 June 2001) and the June 2001 meeting of the oecd Fiscal
Affairs Committee failed to publish the expected updated blacklist. The
oecd threat of blanket economic sanctions against delinquent jurisdic-
tions by July 2001 rang hollow and its campaign against discriminatory
tax practices seemed fatally wounded. In July 2001 Bush’s chief economic
advisor, Lawrence Lindsey, confirmed that the White House was consider-
ing the complete abolition of personal and corporate income taxes in the
United States as an ultimate objective (New York Times, 16 July 2001).
Greater transparency (or limited international information exchange)
remained the only goal of the ravaged initiative that had any possibility
of surviving (Money Laundering Monitor, July 2001). The Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development soon conceded that no sanc-
tions would be introduced until April 2003, at the earliest. The Bush
administration’s attack on the oecd tax effort further frayed its relations
with left-of-center governments in Europe (which saw the US administra-
tion as having been captured by corporate interests)—following conflicts
over policies ranging from global warming to missile defense. 
The net results of the Bush administration’s actions were to move from
threatening multilateral sanctions to encouraging bilateral treaties and
agreements in relation to taxation and money laundering, while preserv-
ing ofc fiscal sovereignty. Bilateral agreements between the United States
and offshore centers have not been seen as meeting oecd objectives. The
Marshall Islands have been on all of the oecd blacklists, but the Islands
had a bilateral treaty to exchange tax information with the United States
for a number of years before the first blacklist appeared. The international
organization continues to expect the United States to use its close links
with the Marshalls under the Compact of Free Association to encourage
the Islands to end oecd-defined “harmful tax practices” (Samuels and
Kolb 2001, 252). There has been little support for this multilateralism in
US Republican circles. 
Soon after Bush took office, his administration also considered signifi-
cantly cutting US support for the fatf initiative. Although conservatives
often find measures against money laundering to be more acceptable than
actions against international tax avoidance (Helleiner 1999), Bush ordered
the Treasury Department to review US anti-laundering laws and enforce-
ment (which were seen by some Bush allies as a violation of privacy and
a wasteful burden on the US government, the US economy, and the finan-
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cial industry). Pressure from the Bush administration had led to a delay
in the original fatf deadline of 31 June 2001 for sanctions against black-
listed countries (Financial Times, 1 June 2001). Nauru, which was granted
a reprieve from fatf sanctions until 31 September 2001, was then given
another—until 30 November 2001—after passing some anti–money laun-
dering laws. The Financial Stability Forum and its concerns have not yet
become prominent on the Bush agenda. 
11 September 2001
Most Democrats remained committed to strengthening the fsf, fatf,
and oecd initiatives and have advocated firmer actions against offshore
financial centers. They saw the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11
September 2001 as a new opportunity to connect the dangers posed by
offshore centers with the funding of illegal organizations and threats to
national security. It is ironic that some of the victims in the World Trade
Centers in New York were involved in offshore finance.
International relations since the end of the Cold War have been unpre-
dictable, and the terrorist attacks of 11 September completely changed
the US view of Russia—from its being the target of deep US suspicion to
becoming an essential ally in the war against terrorism. Media reports of
Russian criminality subsided as the Kremlin welcomed the US military
into its sphere of influence in central Asia. The United States supported
Russia’s efforts to be removed from the fatf blacklist (Prime Tass, 4
April 2002). 
However, the sudden disappearance of the Russian threat did not reha-
bilitate the reputations of Pacific Islands offshore centers that had been
linked with Russian clients. Instead, the anti-laundering movement refo-
cused to view offshore financial centers (including those in Oceania) as
expediting the financing of terror. The media reflected the new emphasis
after 11 September, as when Newsweek reported: “While tiny Caribbean
and Pacific-island banking centers like to portray themselves as discreet
harbors for the wealth of the rich and powerful, investigators believe they
have become money-laundering havens for terrorists and other criminals”
(15 Oct 2001, 68). The Pacific Islands media asked questions such as,
“Should Christian countries play host to an industry with proven links to
organised crime and now terror?” (Pacific Magazine, Feb 2002, 27).
Reports began circulating in the international media that about one third
of Nauru’s offshore banks were owned by Middle Eastern interests
(Agence France-Presse, 27 Sept 2001).
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On 5 December 2001 the Financial Action Task Force decided (for the
first time in its twelve-year history) to recommend that countermeasures
be imposed on a country, namely Nauru. In February 2002 it suggested
that the sanctions be continued. Nauru’s government threatened legal
action against the task force, claiming that it had already met the origi-
nal fatf demand by passing extensive anti–money laundering legislation
(Asia Pulse, 6 Feb 2002). European countries (especially France and Ger-
many) were reported to be imposing countermeasures on Nauru. Social-
ist Lionel Jospin, the French prime minister at the time, contrasted the
enthusiasm of Europe for ending the financial flows that support terrorism
with the alleged inaction of the United States against the Pacific nation—
and questioned the reality of US commitment to the cause (Agence France-
Presse, 11 Feb 2002). 
Following 11 September lawmakers in Washington demonstrated their
determination to fight terrorism by passing anti–money laundering legis-
lation that was largely based on the Clinton administration’s initiatives.
There were some significant alterations: The bills proposed by Clinton and
the Democrats had explicitly identified tax havens as being of “primary
money laundering concern” (and, as such, they could be sanctioned by
the US Treasury secretary). However, after the assaults on New York and
Washington, prominent House Republicans and the Bush administration
initially attempted to eliminate all anti-laundering provisions from the
anti-terrorism bill (American Banker, 15 Oct 2001)—agreeing with bank-
ers that anti-laundering measures would have done nothing to prevent the
11 September attacks because the funds going to the terrorists had not
been derived from crime and hence had not been laundered (The Banker,
Nov 2001). After that strategy failed (as the Democrats had recently won
control of the Senate), the Republicans still managed to remove any men-
tion of tax in the bill that eventually passed into law in October—under
the striking title of the USA Patriot Act of 2001 (CQ Weekly, 6, 13, and
20 Oct 2001). 
This represented a problem for the Organisation for Economic Devel-
opment and Cooperation, which was attempting to define its tax-oriented
campaign as part of a financial effort to stop terrorism and money laun-
dering. The terrorist attacks had not increased the Bush administration’s
real support for the oecd campaign, even in the emasculated form that
it had assumed. As the result of pressure from the Republicans in the
United States, the international organization had (at least temporarily)
abandoned three of its initial goals. Its explicit agenda no longer included
the elimination of (1) unfair tax competition; (2) systems that gave tax
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advantages to entities with no substantial activities or presence; or (3)
ring-fencing (where offshore tax and financial arrangements are available
only to outsiders, not to residents). Even the remaining oecd projects—
calling for transparency (the ability to produce information when
requested) and information exchange—had been weakened.
The Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation had set
a 28 February 2002 deadline for tax havens to commit themselves to this
program, but by that date only eleven of the thirty-five jurisdictions black-
listed in June 2000 had made the commitment. The organization decided
to ignore its deadline and engage in intensive negotiations with the remain-
ing twenty-four countries before issuing a new blacklist. It emphasized
that it was extending its deadline for the Pacific Islands offshore centers in
particular (Radio New Zealand, 20 March 2002). A change in govern-
ment in the Cook Islands in March 2002 led to a significant weakening of
anti-oecd sentiment there, and this also had some effect on Sämoa and
then Niue, which all reached agreements with the organization shortly
before the new oecd blacklist was to be released. 
On 18 April 2002 the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development claimed victory—indicating that all but seven recalcitrants
had agreed to cooperate with its global campaign. On the same day, it
issued a new blacklist of only these seven countries—Nauru, Vanuatu, and
the Marshall Islands in the Pacific; Liechtenstein, Monaco, and Andorra
in Europe; and Liberia in Africa. While the three Pacific countries had leg-
islated and established new systems against money laundering to placate
the Financial Action Task Force, their attitude toward the oecd was quite
antagonistic. All of them announced in February and March 2002 that
they would not be signing agreements to reform their tax policies (and
thereby compromise their sovereignty) along the lines that the oecd rec-
ommended (Offshore Investment, March 2002; Radio New Zealand
International, 14 March 2002; Reuters, 27 Feb 2002).
As the metropolitan media reported the oecd victory, two important
features of the commitments given by the twenty-eight countries were fre-
quently ignored or given little prominence. Firstly, the agreements covered
only the sharply reduced oecd goals of transparency and information
exchange. Secondly, they contained a potentially debilitating “Isle of Man”
clause—specifying that these commitments were not binding unless all
oecd countries agree to the same rules. oecd member countries (includ-
ing the “permanent abstainers” Switzerland and Luxembourg) had been
given until April 2003 to eliminate “harmful tax practices,” while the non-
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oecd offshore centers that signed commitments were given until 2005 to
do so. 
Tax haven promoters considered agreement within the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development to be highly unlikely and they
switched their attention to defeating impending tax harmonization mea-
sures within the organization itself. In particular they worked for the
anticipated defeat of the Savings Tax Directive of the European Union
(EU), which would require automatic and mandatory information shar-
ing among all EU members and would be ineffective without the cooper-
ation of non-EU members such as Switzerland and the United States that
seemed unlikely to sign similar agreements (Offshore Investment, March
2002). The rejection of this measure was seen as derailing the entire oecd
campaign against tax havens, and offshore promoters warned countries
with offshore centers that they must resist any oecd attempts to invali-
date the “Isle of Man” clauses in their commitment agreements.
Meanwhile, the Bush administration was distancing itself from the
European Union and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development by concluding new bilateral tax treaties with a number of
offshore financial centers. These treaties differed substantially from the
multilateral models that European social democracies supported. These
US treaties (which US Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill was seeing as a way
of changing the oecd focus) called for a rather limited form of informa-
tion exchange (Financial Times, 19 Feb 2002). Offshore promoters felt
that if a country as powerful as the United States could be satisfied with
relatively little, then the greater oecd demands, or demands of European
countries such as France, could be more easily resisted or at least tempo-
rized until there was a shift to the right in European politics. In the mean-
time, prominent Republicans in the United States continued to attack the
oecd anti–tax haven campaign, even in its weakened form.
Further conflicts with the Bush administration can be anticipated if the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development pushes for-
ward with more challenges to offshore centers. The organization plans to
launch new initiatives against flag-of-convenience shipping (see van Fos-
sen 1992), insurance, mutual funds and closed-end investment funds, leas-
ing companies, debt-issuing vehicles, and abusive corporate vehicles in off-
shore financial centers, as well as international moves against lawyers,
accountants, and other professionals who create offshore structures (Off-
shore Investment, June 2001; Aug 2001).
What remains to be seen is whether the Organisation for Economic
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Cooperation and Development can continue to link its attack on tax min-
imization with the fatf campaign on the much more emotive issue of
money laundering. While the oecd initiative encountered widespread
resistance from targeted countries (at least until it was greatly weakened
and substantially qualified), the fatf initiative met no such opposition
and its recommendations were generally being followed. The Financial
Action Task Force has left its mark on offshore financial centers in the
Pacific Islands and elsewhere—most visibly in new legislation. But here
again a change in direction is possible.
Conclusion
The future of Pacific Islands offshore financial centers may rest on the
outcome of political struggles in the United States, other core countries,
and international organizations. Without a high degree of international
cooperation, sanctions against offshore financial centers in Oceania are
unlikely to be very effective. Obtaining global cooperation may be diffi-
cult—especially if the goals are substantial and time is short. On the other
hand, hostility to tax havens from social democratic governments has
become intense and organized since the mid-1990s. Two things are clear—
that the dominant media images of a number of Pacific Islands states may
continue to be shaped by socially constructed perceptions of their offshore
financial centers (making them targets of moral indignation) and that their
international relations may at times be held hostage to the issue of their
tax havens.
Notes
This article was written in April 2002. The situation described continues to
change.
1 A tax haven is a jurisdiction that allows residents or foreigners to minimize
their tax payments. An offshore financial center is a tax haven jurisdiction that
has at least one significant institution primarily oriented toward accepting
deposits and investment funds, and where intentional government policy is ori-
ented toward attracting the business of foreigners by creating legal entities and
structures, or facilitating immigration, naturalization, residence, or the acquisi-
tion of passports, to allow foreigners to minimize taxes, regulation, loss of assets,
unwanted financial disclosure, and forced disposition of property. All offshore
financial centers are tax havens. Not all tax havens are offshore financial centers
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(eg, the Federated States of Micronesia and Pitcairn Island are tax havens, but
not offshore financial centers). For the first comprehensive overview of the inter-
nal development of all Pacific Islands offshore financial centers—the major ones
(Vanuatu, the Cook Islands, Sämoa, the Marshall Islands, Niue, and Nauru) as
well as the minor ones (Tonga, Palau, Norfolk Island, Guam, and the Northern
Marianas)—see van Fossen 2002.
2 Money laundering is the practice of channeling illegally obtained funds
through a third party in order to conceal their true source and make them appear
to be legitimate.
3 The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 was an initial effort to identify laundering
activities, but it did not criminalize laundering itself. Its reporting requirements
were poorly enforced by the US government and often flagrantly ignored by banks
until the mid-1980s, when a “moral panic” associated with the Bank of Boston
case assisted the passage of new laws (Nichols 1997).
4 In 1980 the Council of Europe, amid concern about the growing problem of
kidnapping, adopted a formal recommendation (Measures Against the Transfer
and Safekeeping of Funds of Criminal Origin), which was the first thorough inter-
national attempt to move against laundering, but it received little real support
(Alexander 2001; Gilmore 1995).
5 While Erna Va‘ai, the head of Sämoa’s offshore financial center, had heard
many allegations and speculations about Russian businessmen appearing in the
Pacific Islands, the story about the US middleman acting on behalf of the Rus-
sians was one she had not come across (Islands Business, Feb 2000).
6 Australian Financial Review, 27 Jan 2000; Fortune International, 24 Jan
2000; Islands Business, Feb 2000; Offshore Investment, Sept 2001; PITCO Vanu-
atu Update, April 2000; Radio Australia, 14 Feb 2000; Radio New Zealand Inter-
national, 23 Dec 1999; 12 Jan 2000; Reuters, 11 Feb 2000.
7 Australian, 24 Dec 1999; Guam Business, April 2001; Paciﬁc Islands
Monthly, Feb 2000; Palau Horizon, 24 Dec 1999; 14 Jan 2000; 9, 23 June 2000;
7 July 2000; 26 Oct 2000; 22 June 2001.
8 The bill proposed criminalizing the laundering of proceeds of foreign crimes
such as fraud, bribery, misappropriation of public funds, arms trafficking, and
crimes of violence (US House of Representatives 2000b, 3). It was similar to the
anti-laundering bills proposed by the Clinton administration in 1998 and 1999
(Fendo 2000), which the Republican-dominated Congress did not adopt.
9 The g-7 established the Financial Stability Forum in the wake of the Asian
and Russian financial crises on 20 February 1999. It has 40 members: 25 repre-
senting the g-7 countries and their financial authorities, 6 the international finan-
cial institutions, 6 the international regulatory and supervisory groupings, and 2
the committees of central bank experts.
10 The task force has twenty-nine members, including the offshore centers of
Hong Kong (China), Ireland, Luxembourg, Singapore, and Switzerland.
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11 The only US preferential tax regime subject to oecd attack (the Foreign
Sales Corporation legislation) had a Pacific connection but was repealed in 2000.
This came after the World Trade Organization found, in favor of the European
Union, that Foreign Sales Corporations—7 percent or 346 of which were in
Guam—produced an illegal export subsidy of $1.4 billion to $2.5 billion a year
(van Fossen 2002).
12 A few months before, however, there were reports that two Scotland Yard
detectives had spent a week on Rarotonga in January 2001 investigating a case
of suspected money laundering (Cook Islands News, 2 Feb 2001).
13 Despite the vast amounts of money that nominally flow through Pacific
Islands offshore financial centers, they have in fact made relatively modest direct
contributions to government revenues: Niue 6.5 percent (1999), Vanuatu 6.4 per-
cent (2000), Cook Islands 4.5 percent (1997), Sämoa 2.1 percent (1999), Nauru
2.0 percent (1999), Marshall Islands 1.6 percent (1996), and Guam 0.2 percent
(1994). There are also lesser indirect contributions (van Fossen 2002).
14 This is despite Oxfam’s claim that offshore centers drain $50 billion a year
from developing countries (see Naylor 1994).
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Abstract
Pacific Islands offshore financial centers (ofcs) are battling against the danger
that international organizations will cut them off from the global financial system.
Since 1999 the image of the region’s tax havens has been most shaped by the
“horror story” of Nauru—the media’s account of how Nauru has been involved
with the Bank of New York and other banks in tens of billions of dollars of Rus-
sian money laundering, tax evasion, and illegal capital flight. In the late 1990s
left-of-center governments led international organizations toward a much more
aggressive attack on offshore financial centers. Soon international organizations
began blacklisting offshore centers and threatening sanctions—with Pacific
Islands being prominent targets. The advent of the conservative Bush administra-
tion in America defused a number of threats to offshore centers from international
organizations, as the United States began to object to Europe’s anti–tax haven
agenda. While the attacks of 11 September 2001 led international organizations
to rebuke offshore centers for helping to finance terrorism, ofc promoters con-
tended that the anti-ofc campaign had been so weakened and qualified since the
Bush presidency that it might soon collapse. The future of Pacific Islands offshore
centers may rest on the outcome of political struggles in the United States, Europe,
and international organizations. Two things are clear: that the dominant media
image of a number of Pacific Islands states may continue to be shaped by percep-
tions of their offshore financial centers (making them targets of moral indigna-
tion), and that their international relations may at times be held hostage to the
issue of their tax havens. 
keywords: tax havens, offshore financial centers, money laundering, Pacific
Islands, sanctions, international relations, social construction
